Commercial Speech Doctrine Knocked Out by Boxing Advertising: The Destructive Effect of Adams v. Nevada Athletic Commission on First Amendment Limitations by Feldmeir, Christopher T.
Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 
Volume 16 Access to Justice: The Social Responsibility of Lawyers | New Federalism 
January 2004 
Commercial Speech Doctrine Knocked Out by Boxing Advertising: 
The Destructive Effect of Adams v. Nevada Athletic Commission 
on First Amendment Limitations 
Christopher T. Feldmeir 
Washington University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Christopher T. Feldmeir, Commercial Speech Doctrine Knocked Out by Boxing Advertising: The Destructive 
Effect of Adams v. Nevada Athletic Commission on First Amendment Limitations, 16 WASH. U. J. L. & 
POL’Y 313 (2004), 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol16/iss1/15 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Journal of Law & Policy by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
313 
 
Commercial Speech Doctrine Knocked Out by Boxing 
Advertising: The Destructive Effect of Adams v. 
Nevada Athletic Commission on First Amendment 
Limitations  
Christopher T. Feldmeir* 
On September 29, 2001, boxer Bernard Hopkins successfully 
defeated the defending middle-weight title holder, Felix Trinidad.1 
However, Hopkin’s victory was overshadowed by the trend he began 
that night. In addition to the typical boxing apparel—shoes, shorts, 
and gloves—Hopkins sported a temporary tattoo across his back 
advertising Golden Palace’s online casino website, 
GoldenPalace.com.2 The ad ushered in a new trend in boxing 
marketing, where shirtless backs provide walking billboards for 
advertisers like Golden Palace.3  
Athlete and celebrity endorsements are not a new concept. Every 
day television, radio, and print media showcase advertisements 
featuring celebrities who endorse products.4 These ads serve three 
purposes: (1) to provide the showcasing media with revenue,5 (2) to 
 * J.D. Candidate (2004), Washington University School of Law. 
 1. Harvey Araton, Sports of the Times, Warlike Hyperbole, but Peaceful Ending, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 30, 2001, § 8, at 6. (describing the Trinidad-Hopkins bout). 
 2. Kevin Iole, Online Casino Wins Injunction, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Mar. 7, 2002, at 7C. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Numerous companies use celebrity endorsements to promote their products. A 
morning listener of KPNT-FM 105.7 in St. Louis, Missouri, can often hear Howard Stern 
promoting automobile sales for O’Fallon Toyota and BMW in O’Fallon, Illinois. The Howard 
Stern Radio Show (KROCK syndicated radio broadcast). A reader of Sports Illustrated can 
view an image of Julius Erving endorsing the new General Motors GMC Envoy. SPORTS 
ILLUSTRATED, Feb. 17, 2003, at 21. And: A viewer of network television can witness Catherine 
Zeta-Jones espousing the virtues of T-Mobile, Inc., a cellular phone service provider. See Press 
Release, T-Mobil International, Actress Catherine Zeta-Jones Signs with T-Mobile International 
as Global Spokeswoman (June 11, 2002), at http://www.t-mobile.com/company/pressroom/ 
pressrelease26.asp (announcing the actress’ new role as company spokeswoman). 
 5. Projected Ad Spending, 2005, MARKET SHARE REP. 425 (Robert S. Lazich ed., 2002). 
Projected advertisement spending for 2005 indicates that nearly 196 billion dollars will be spent 
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expose the endorsed product to consumers,6 and (3) to provide the 
featured celebrity with revenue and exposure.7 Hopkin’s temporary 
tattoo served all three purposes.8 
Hopkins’s tattoo also prompted one of boxing’s major governing 
bodies to act in order to control the new form of celebrity 
endorsement. The Nevada Athletic Commission (the “Commission”), 
exerting its authority to control activity in the boxing ring, banned the 
use of temporary tattoos.9 Clarence Adams, a Nevada-licensed boxer, 
challenged the ban on First Amendment grounds in Adams v. Nevada 
Athletic Commission.10 On March 14, 2002, the Eighth Judicial 
District of Nevada issued a preliminary injunction against the ban.11 
By doing so, the court not only prevented the Commission from 
guarding against the distraction of match judges and promoting the 
integrity of the sport, but expanded the protection afforded 
commercial speech beyond that intended by the United States 
Supreme Court.  
While the First Amendment12 protects a person’s freedom of 
speech,13 it creates distinctions in the level of protection offered to 
different kinds of speech;14 some forms of speech retain the full 
on advertisements, including 58.9 billion dollars on newspaper ads and 52.3 billion dollars on 
broadcast television ads. Id. 
 6. Finding the Sweet Spot, FOOTWEAR NEWS, July 22, 2002, at 22. In Finding the Sweet 
Spot, Neil Cole, President and CEO of Candie’s apparel company, describes the relationship 
between celebrity endorsements and the footwear and clothing maker’s business growth. Cole 
asserts that the “celebrity is a great vehicle to draw attention to the brand and product.” Id. 
During Candie’s celebrity campaign, Candie’s witnessed a 7.4% rise in sales. Id. 
 7. See Associated Press, Off-Air Jordan: Former NBA Great Quits Endorsement Deals 
(Mar. 23, 2000), available at http://more.abcnews.go.com/sections/sports/DailyNews/ 
jordan_000322.html. In 1999, basketball star Michael Jordan earned an estimated thirty-five to 
forty million dollars for his endorsement deals. Id. 
 8. Hopkins was no doubt paid to wear the tattoo and the tattoo exposed Golden 
Palace.com to the hundreds of thousands of viewers of the bout. 
 9. Nevada State Athletic Commission—Homepage, at http://boxing.nv.gov (last updated 
Nov. 12, 2003). Operating under Chapter 467 of the Nevada Revised Statutes Chapter 467, the 
Commission promulgates regulations governing unarmed combatants. Id. 
 10. A 446674, 2002 WL 1967500 at *1 (Nev. Dist. Ct. 2002). 
 11. Id. at *2. 
 12. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 13. The history of freedom of speech spans from the Sedition Act of 1792 to the modern 
era of First Amendment common law holdings. Judith Schenck Koffler & Bennett L. 
Gershman, The New Seditious Libel, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 816, 818 (1984). For a discussion of 
seditious libel, see generally id. 
 14. See, e.g., Patricia R. Stembridge, Note, Adjusting Absolutism: First Amendment 
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protection against government infringement, while others possess 
only limited protection.15 Since 1942, one distinction stressed by the 
Court arises between “expressive” and “commercial” speech.16 The 
Court views expressive speech broadly: as speech that involves the 
interchange of ideas.17 However, the Court views commercial speech 
more narrowly: as speech that proposes a commercial transaction.18 
The Court affords only limited protection to commercial speech,19 
permitting content-neutral restrictions of commercial speech20 that 
satisfy a four-part analysis.21  
Hopkin’s and Golden Palace’s tattoo advertisement is 
commercial.22 As such, the Adams court should have subjected the 
Protection for the Fringe, 80 B.U. L. REV. 907, 924-25 n.137 (2000) (quoting American 
Communications Ass’n, C.I.O. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 399 (1950)). 
 15. See id. at 924-25. Limiting First Amendment protection is debatable at the academic 
level because some legal scholars view the Amendment in absolutist terms. Id. at 914. 
Stembridge describes Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black’s absolutist position when 
interpreting the First Amendment, stating that Black believed the framers’ intented to prohibit 
government from enacting any law that violated the Amendment. Id. at 915 (citing TINSLEY E. 
YARBROUGH, MR. JUSTICE BLACK AND HIS CRITICS 133 (quoting Justice Black in Edmund 
Cahn, Justice Black and First Amendment “Absolutes”: A Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
549, 557 (1962))). However, case law demonstrates less room for debate. See id. at 915 
(describing how Justice Black distinguished between speech and conduct to limit the 
Amendment’s protections in NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760, 
377 U.S. 58, 77 (1964)); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973) (reaffirming the inability of 
the First Amendment to protect speech that incites imminent lawless action). Thus, there are 
limitations to the right to free speech. 
 16. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). 
 17. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (discussing the First Amendment’s protection 
of expressive speech in terms of securing a free and unfettered exchange of political 
expressions) (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957); Winters v. New York, 333 
U.S. 507, 510 (1948)). 
 18. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 153 
(2002). 
 19. See generally Michael Hoefges & Milagros Rivera-Sanchez, “Vice” Advertising 
Under the Supreme Court’s Commercial Speech Doctrine: The Shifting Central Hudson 
Analysis, 22 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 345 (2000) (tracing the history of governmental 
regulation of commercial speech since 1980). 
 20. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 
771 (1976). 
 21. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
The test requires a court to determine whether the speech concerns lawful activity, the 
government has asserted a substantial interest in restricting speech, the government’s restriction 
advances that interest, and the restriction is the least intrusive means to further the stated 
interest. Id at 566. 
 22. See Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 256 (Cal. 2002) (stating that when the speaker is 
engaged in commerce, its intended audience is potential customers, and its content is 
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Commission’s ban to the Supreme Court’s four-part analysis.23 The 
regulation satisfies that four-part analysis, but the court mistakenly 
prohibited the Commission from exercising its power to regulate the 
commercial speech activities of its member athletes.24  
This Note discusses the reasons why future reviews of bans on 
temporary tattoo advertisements should not follow Adams. That 
decision overextends the United States Supreme Court’s Commercial 
Speech Doctrine. Further judicial action on temporary tattoo 
advertisements should permit their prohibition. Part I.A describes the 
history of the Commercial Speech Doctrine, focusing on the major 
Supreme Court rulings and permissible government restrictions of 
commercial speech. Part I.B discusses Adams. Part II analyzes Adams 
in light of controlling common law. Finally, Part III suggests that 
Adams should be overturned. 
I. HISTORY 
A. The History of the Commercial Speech Doctrine 
The First Amendment protects the abridgment of an individual’s 
freedom of speech by an act of federal or state government,25 but this 
protection is not absolute.26 The judiciary has examined a number of 
circumstances when state or federal actions restricting a person’s 
right to free speech do not violate the Constitution.27 One such 
circumstance is the government’s restriction on commercial speech. 
commercial—it is made to promote the product—the speech is commercial). Commercial 
speakers, the casino corporations, produce the ads; these speakers direct the advertisement to a 
commercial audience; and the ads suggest the boxer supports the casino to promote sales. 
 23. See infra Part I. 
 24. Adams v. Nev. Athletic Comm’n, No. A446674, 2002 WL 1967500, at *2 (Nev. Dist. 
Ct. 2002). 
 25. U.S. CONST. amends. I, XIV. 
 26. See Stembridge, supra note 14 (describing an academic debate over the absolutist 
qualities of the First Amendment). 
 27. Id. These include bans on inciteful or obscene speech. See Schenck v. United States, 
249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (dictum) (stating that “[t]he most stringent protection of free speech 
would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic”); Marks v. 
United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193-94 (1977) (describing the constitutionality of restricting 
obscene expressions). 
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1. Evolution of the Commercial Speech Doctrine 
In Valentine v. Chrestensen, the Supreme Court first distinguished 
between expressive and commercial speech.28 Valentine involved the 
owner of a decommissioned naval submarine who moored his vessel 
to docks on the East River to sell interior cabin tours.29 To solicit 
customers the owner printed advertisements on pamphlets and 
distributed the pamphlets to people walking the city streets.30 This 
action violated a New York City ordinance prohibiting the 
distribution of commercial and business advertising in city streets.31 
The man was ticketed and fined.32 He challenged the ordinance, 
claiming that it violated his right to free speech.33 At trial, the lower 
federal court struck down the ordinance as a violation of the First 
Amendment.34 The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, ruling that 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments did not protect commercial 
speech.35 
In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens 
Consumer Council, the Supreme Court again addressed the 
Constitution’s protection of commercial speech.36 Unlike the Court’s 
complete rejection of constitutional protection for commercial speech 
in Valentine, the Court granted commercial speech limited 
constitutional protection.37 In doing so, the Court ushered in the 
modern era of the Commercial Speech Doctrine. In Virginia State, 
pharmacists challenged a Virginia law that considered a licensed 
pharmacist who advertised prices for prescription drugs as engaged in 
“unprofessional conduct.”38 Virginia suggested that such advertising 
caused customers to choose cheaper drugs without understanding that 
 28. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). 
 29. Id. at 53. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id.  
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 54. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. The Court reasoned that the submarine owner merely used the political protest 
exception to circumvent the sanitary code’s ordinance. Id. at 55. 
 36. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
 37. Id. at 761-62. 
 38. Id. at 749-50. 
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the drugs may be less effective.39 The Court overruled the law. It 
reasoned that while expressive commercial speech deserves only 
limited constitutional protections, a strong interest in the free flow of 
information required the Court to find the state law 
unconstitutional.40 However, the Court’s protection was limited 
because it based its holding on the fact that the Virginia ban was not 
content neutral.41 
In Central Hudson Gas & Electric v. Public Service Commission 
of New York, the Court continued its exploration of commercial 
speech protections.42 In Central Hudson, the Court reversed a ban on 
advertising that promoted the use of electricity.43 In finding the ban 
unconstitutional, the Court established a four-part test to examine 
bans on commercial speech.44 The test requires courts to determine 
whether: (1) the expression concerns unlawful activity, (2) the 
government asserted a substantial interest in restricting the speech, 
(3) the regulation directly advances that interest, and (4) the chosen 
regulation imposes the least restrictive means to affect that interest.45 
In reversing the ban, the Court found that the restriction was too 
broad,46 and thus, failed the fourth prong of the analysis.47  
 39. Id. at 769. The state believed it could remedy this problem by simply not allowing the 
pharmacist to advertise drug prices, thereby eliminating the possibility of customers seeking the 
lower-cost, and potentially lower-quality, medicines. Id. at 769. 
 40. Id. at 761.  
 41. Id. at 771 (citations omitted). 
 42. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
 43. Id. at 561. The lower court found that advertising for electricity served no public 
interest because the public had no choice in their source of electricity. Id. Consequently, the 
court found “the prohibition outweighed the limited constitutional value of the commercial 
speech at issue.” Id. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, stating that this rationale was 
insufficient to infringe the constitutional protections affored commercial speech. Id. at 567. 
 44. Id. at 566. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 570. The State articulated two interests: to promote energy conservation and to 
prevent price inequities “caused by the failure to base the utilities’ rates on marginal cost.” Id. 
at 568. While the Court found a direct link between the ban and the interest to conserve energy, 
it found only a tenuous connection between the ban and the state’s equity concerns and that less 
intrusive measures could adequately achieve the state’s interest. Id. at 569–70. See also Richard 
Z. Lehv & Ronald E. Wiggins, False Advertising and Other Lanham Act Section 43(A) Claims, 
in LITIGATING COPYRIGHT, TRADEMARK & UNFAIR COMPETITION CASES FOR THE 
EXPERIENCED PRACTITIONER 425, 430 (Bruce P. Keller & D. Peter Harvey co-chairs, 1998) 
(stating that “the Court found that the ban was overly broad to the extent that it covered speech 
which in no manner interfered with the State’s interest on energy conservation”). 
 47. Id. at 564-66.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol16/iss1/15
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Together, Virginia State and Central Hudson establish the modern 
framework for the Commercial Speech Doctrine. As a threshold 
matter, a government’s restriction on commercial speech must be 
content-neutral.48 Non-content-neutral regulations are analyzed 
through Central Hudson’s four-part test.49 Only non-content-neutral 
prohibitions that fail the test violate the speaker’s protected right to 
engage in commercial speech. 
2. Recent Decisions: Reflections on the Central Hudson Test 
Although Central Hudson’s analysis continues, dissenting justices 
in recent cases have sought to grant increased First Amendment 
protection to commercial speech.50 For example, in 44 Liquormart, 
Inc. v. Rhode Island, a plurality of the Court sought to expand 
Central Hudson’s analysis.51 44 Liquormart involved a challenge 
Rhode Island’s prohibition against the advertisement of alcoholic 
beverage prices.52 The state fined 44 Liquormart’s owner for making 
an implied reference to liquor prices in his advertisements.53 The 
district court found the statute unconstitutional,54 but the circuit court 
reversed.55 A divided Supreme Court reversed the circuit court, 
finding Rhode Island’s ban unconstitutional.56 In striking down the 
ban, the Court disagreed on the analysis to apply. Writing the 
plurality opinion, Justice Stevens expanded Central Hudson’s 
analysis, acknowledging a new “special care” requirement in the 
 48. See Va. State Bd. of Pharm., 425 U.S. at 771. 
 49. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. 
 50. See Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. 
Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001); Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 
(1999); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996). 
 51. 517 U.S. 484, 488-89, 528 (1996). 
 52. Id. at 489-90. The first statute prohibited advertising the price of alcohol by in-state 
and out-of-state venders. Id. The second statute prohibited the Rhode Island news media from 
broadcasting advertisements containing alcoholic beverage price references. Id. The stated 
purposes of the statutes included furtherance of the state’s temperance goals. Id.  
 53. Id. at 492-93 (stating that a $400 fine was imposed on the vendor for his 
advertisements, which included references to low prices for chips and mixers and identified, 
without reference to price, brands of available liquor).  
 54. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Racine, 829 F. Supp. 543, 545 (R.I. 1993). 
 55. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 494 (citing 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Racine, 39 F.3d 5 (1st 
Cir. 1994)). 
 56. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 516. 
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four-pronged test.57 Concurring, Justice O’Connor disagreed with 
Stevens’ expansion, and affirmed Central Hudson’s four-part 
approach, finding that the ban violated the fourth prong.58 Thus, 
while a plurality of the Court flirted with expanding the Commercial 
Speech Doctrine, no majority opinion existed to change it Doctrine.59  
Subsequent Court decisions also failed to expand Central Hudson, 
but suggested the reasonableness of Stevens’s 44 Liquormart 
opinion. In Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Association v. United 
States, the Court referenced the judicial disagreement between 
O’Connor and Stevens, but declined to affirm Stevens’ “special care 
analysis,” unanimously adhering to Central Hudson’s four-part 
analysis.60 Greater New Orleans involved a challenge to a federal 
statute prohibiting television or radio broadcasts of lottery and 
casino-gambling advertisements.61 The Court found that the ban 
failed Central Hudson’s third prong because the restriction speech 
did not further Louisiana’s interests in reducing the social cost 
associated with gambling62 and assisting neighboring states’ 
 57. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 500. Justice Stevens derived the “special care” language 
from Central Hudson. Id. (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 
557, 566 n.9 (1980)). In Central Hudson, the Court stressed the need to treat regulations that 
ban commercial speech with “special care” to further non-speech-related policies. Central 
Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 n.9. 
 58. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 532 (O’Connor, J., concurring). O’Connor maintained that 
Steven’s expansion was unnecessary and uncalled for because the Court could find the 
regulation violated Central Hudson standard without it. Id.  
 59. Stevens also addressed the state’s contention that the legislature’s ban should enjoy 
considerable deference because the state alone has the authority to prohibit advertising outright. 
See Lehv & Wiggins, supra note 47, at 431. Stevens rejected this contention and warned that 
“banning speech may sometimes prove far more intrusive than banning conduct.” Id. (citing 44 
Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 511). 
 60. 527 U.S. 173, 183 (1999). 
 61. Id. at 176. 18 U.S.C. § 1304 (2003) houses the prohibition on gambling. During the 
first half of the 20th Century, § 1304’s predecessor banned all broadcasts that disseminated 
information about lotteries. Id. The Federal Communications Commission enforced this ban 
through administrative sanctions on radio and television licensees. Id. (citing 47 C.F.R. 
§ 73.1211 (1998)). However, in the last half of the 20th Century, Congress responded to the 
popularity of lotteries by narrowing the scope of § 1304. Id. at 178. Now, § 1304 allows 
advertisements for state-conducted lotteries, so long as they are broadcast from within the state 
conducting the lottery. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1307(a)(1)(B)). Additionally, Congress allows 
gambling by Native American casinos, not-for-profit organizations, and commercial 
organizations for which gambling is “clearly occasional and ancillary to its primary business.” 
Id. at 179 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1307(a)(2); 25 U.S.C. § 2710).  
 62. Id. at 185. According to Louisiana’s Solicitor General, the social costs of gambling 
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prohibitions gambling. The Court also found that the ban failed the 
fourth prong because the regulation was not narrowly tailored.63  
In 2001, the Court again affirmed Central Hudson’s analysis in 
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly.64 Lorillard Tobacco involved a 
challenge to Massachusetts’s restriction on point-of-sale and outdoor 
tobacco advertisements.65 The lower courts found that the ban did not 
violate free speech,66 but the Supreme Court disagreed.67 While again 
acknowledging the debate in 44 Liquormart, the Court nevertheless 
affirmed Central Hudson’s analysis.68 The Court recognized 
Massachusetts’s multiple interests, but found that the restriction on 
point-of-sale advertising failed Central Hudson’s third and fourth 
prongs,69 and that the ban on outdoor advertising failed the fourth 
prong.70 Like New Orleans, the Court focused on the relationship 
between the stated interests and the restrictions imposed, finding that 
the ban violated the Central Hudson’s third and fourth prongs.71  
stem from the compulsive nature of the activity and include the promotion of organized crime, 
corruption, bribery, drug trafficking, and the imposition of a regressive tax on the poor. Id. 
 63. Id. at 188. The Court reasoned that because the ban restricted more speech than just 
the speech that threatened Louisiana’s first interest—the dangers associated with gambling—
the ban failed Central Hudson’s fourth prong. Id. at 189. The Court also determined that the 
second interest—preventing gambling ads from traveling into neighboring states that prohibit 
private casinos—failed Central Hudson scrutiny because the exceptions to § 1304 allowed 
various forms of gambling to travel across state lines. Id. at 194-95. 
 64. 533 U.S. 525 (2001). 
 65. Id. at 532. The regulations at issue included those governing advertising for 
“cigarettes, smokeless tobacco, and cigars.” Id. (citing MASS. REGS. CODE TIT. 940 §§ 21.01-
07, 22.01-.09 (2003)). Id. 
 66. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 218 F.3d 30 (1st Cir. 2000); Lorillard Tobacco 
Co. v. Reilly, 76 F. Supp. 2d 124 (D. Mass. 1999). 
 67. Lorillard Tobacco, 533 U.S. at 571 (permitting states to combat underage tobacco use 
through appropriate advertising restrictions, but recognizing that the First Amendment may 
protect the commercial speech of tobacco companies and remanding the case for further 
proceedings). 
 68. Id. at 554-55 (citing 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501, 510-14 
(1996); Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 184 (1999)). 
 69. Id. at 566. See also id. at 566-67 for a discussion of how the Central Hudson test 
applied to the Massachusetts ban on indoor tobacco advertising. 
 70. See id. at 556-61. The Massachusetts’s Attorney General proved that the ban on such 
advertising directly advanced the state’s proffered interest in regulating that speech, satisfying 
the third prong. Id. However, the Court subsequently found the regulation was too broad. Id. at 
565. 
 71. Id. at 556-61, 563. In describing the failed relationship between the restriction and 
Massachusetts’s interests, the court stated: 
[T]he State’s goal is to prevent minors from using tobacco products and to curb 
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In 2002, the Court analyzed commercial speech in Thompson v. 
Western States Medical Center.72 Thompson involved a challenge to 
section 503(a) of the Food and Drug Administration Modernization 
Act of 1997 (FDAMA).73 A group of pharmacists that were engaged 
in drug compounding activities challenged the FDAMA’s conditional 
ban on advertising compounded drugs.74 The government defended 
the ban as promoting three interests: protection of public health;75 
preservation of the availability of some compound drugs;76 and 
achievement of a balance between the first two interests.77 The Court 
found the ban unconstitutional, reasoning that the ban violated 
Central Hudson’s third prong because the government failed to 
demonstrate that the challenged restriction promoted the stated 
interests.78  
In 2002, the Court also affirmed its treatment of commercial 
speech cases in Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. 
demand for that activity by limiting youth exposure to advertising. The 5-foot rule 
[imposed on tobacco advertisers who place ads at the point-of-purchase] does not seem 
to advance that goal. Not all children are less than 5 feet tall, and those who are 
certainly have the ability to look up and take in their surroundings. 
Id. at 566. 
 72. 535 U.S. 357 (2002). 
 73. 21 U.S.C. § 353(a). This section exempts “compound drugs” from the Federal Drug 
Administration’s (FDA’s) standard drug approval system so long as the providers of those 
drugs honor specific restrictions. Id. One such restriction is the prohibition against advertising 
for certain listed compound drugs. Thompson, 535 U.S. at 360. The Court described drug 
compounding as “a process by which a pharmacist or doctor combines, mixes, or alters 
ingredients to create a medication tailored to the needs of an individual patient.” Id. at 360-61. 
 74. Thompson, 535 U.S. at 360. The state alleged that it had an interest in regulating 
compound drugs because the laws regulating ordinary drug manufacturers did not apply to 
manufacturer’s engaged in compounding activities, and that compounding raised the same 
concerns associated with manufacturer’s—mainly injury to the public consumer. Id. at 363-64.  
 75. Id. at 368. This interest included the goal of preserving the effectiveness of the “new 
drug” approval process. Id. at 368-69.  
 76. Id. at 368. Congress understood that commercially available non-compounded drugs 
did not always meet every patient’s specific medical needs. Id. at 369. 
 77. Id. at 368. The third interest demonstrated Congress’ recognition of the need to draw a 
line between large-scale public health issues and small-scale compounding activities. Id. at 370. 
 78. Id. at 373. The majority found that the other restrictions placed on pharmacists and 
doctors who mixed compound drugs, could also have served the state’s interests. Id. at 371. 
Further, the Court found that the government did not meet its burden because it failed to 
provide legislative history documenting that these considerations played a prominent role in 
enacting the ban. Id. at 373. 
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v. Village of Stratton.79 Watchtower Bible involved the challenge of a 
village ordinance that required door-to-door salesmen to obtain a 
permit before soliciting.80 The petitioners organized Jehovah’s 
Witnesses preaching activities and desired to enter private property to 
preach without obtaining the permit.81 Although the petitioners 
claimed that they only solicited donations and did not sell products, 
the ordinance specifically required Jehovah’s Witnesses to obtain a 
permit.82 Both lower federal courts upheld the ordinance as content-
neutral because it prohibited any uninvited solicitor from entering 
private property without cause.83 The Supreme Court reversed.84 It 
reasoned that the ordinance violated Central Hudson’s third prong 
because organizations without large funds often rely on door-to-door 
activities to spread their message.85 
Thus, despite challenges to Central Hudson’s analysis the Court 
continues to adhere to its tenents and has yet to expand it or 
otherwise increase commercial speech protection.86 The Court 
focuses on whether state restrictions promote lawful activity 
conducted in a non-misleading manner, the government has a 
substantial government interest in regulating the speech, the 
regulation directly advances the interest, and the regulation is 
narrowly-tailored.87  
 79. 536 U.S. 150 (2002). 
 80. Id. at 154. Section 116.01 of Ohio’s Ordinance No. 1998-5 prohibited solicitors or 
peddlers from entering private property unless they possessed a permit. Id. at 154 n.1. It 
required the solicitor or peddler to carry the permit on his person when canvassing and to 
present the permit to any police officer or property owner who requested to see it. Id. at 155. 
 81. Id. at 157-58. 
 82. Id. at 157 n.6.  
 83. Id. at 158-60. The district court upheld the ordinance by curing three overly broad 
provisions: a provision requiring that applicants list the specific addresses of homes they intend 
to visit; a provision allowing applicants to satisfy section 116.03(b)(6) by stating their purpose 
as the Jehovah’s Witness ministry; and a provision that banned canvassing after 5:00p.m. Id. at 
158. The circuit court affirmed the content-neutrality of the ordinance. Id. at 159. 
 84. Id. at 169. 
 85. Id. at 163–74. 
 86. See supra notes 51, 59, 60, 68, and accompanying text; see also Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 
45 P.3d 243, 251 (Cal. 2002) (discussing California Supreme Court’s application of the Central 
Hudson test in determining the constitutionality of a commercial speech regulation). The United 
States Supreme Court dismissed its initial granting of certiorari on June 26, 2003, again 
declining the opportunity to alter the Commercial Speech Doctrine. 
 87. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
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B. The History of Adams v. Nevada Athletic Association 
The trend of using tattoos on the backs of boxers as commercial 
speech began on September 29, 2001.88 Following Trinidad’s lead, 
super bantamweight fighter Clarence “Bones” Adams sought to wear 
a tattoo advertisement for Golden Palace during a bout scheduled for 
February 23, 2002.89 Prior to that fight, the Commission banned the 
use of temporary tattoos by all boxers competing in a Nevada ring.90 
The Commission proferred three concerns supporting the ban: boxer 
safety, judging accuracy, and dignity of the sport.91 
Adams challenged the ban, seeking a preliminary injunction in 
Nevada’s Eighth District Court.92 The court awarded Adams an 
injunction, finding that the ban violated the First Amendment’s 
protection of speech because the ban did not advance the Nevada’s 
asserted interests and was not reasonable as to time, manner, and 
place.93 In so ruling, the court impermissibly extended the 
constitutional protection afforded commercial speech.  
II. ANALYSIS 
A. The Advertisement at Issue Fits the Definition of Commercial 
Speech 
In order to distinguish between commercial and expressive 
speech, a content analysis of the speech at issue must be performed.94 
The content of Adam’s temporary tattoo encouraged consumers to 
visit and engage in commercial transactions on GoldenPalace.com. 
 88. Iole, supra note 2, at 7C.  
 89. Adams v. Nev. Athletic Comm’n, No. A 446674, 2002 WL 1967500, at *2 (Nev. Dist. 
Ct. 2002).  
 90. Id.   
 91. Id. at *1. See also NEV. ADMIN. CODE ch. 467, § 598(1) (requiring all boxers to 
present a tidy appearance); Iole, supra note 2; Kirk D. Hendrick & Keith E. Kizer, National 
Association of Attorneys General Seeks to Improve the Sport of Boxing, NEVADA LAWYER, 
April, 1999, at 22.  
 92. Adams, 2002 WL 1967500, at *1. 
 93. Id. at *2 (stating the findings of the district court).  
 94. See, e.g., Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 
150, 153 (2002).  
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The content of the ad encouraged a commercial transaction. Hence, it 
clearly fits within the meaning of commercial speech. 
B. Reviewing Courts Should Uphold the Commission’s Ban Because 
the Ban is Content-Neutral  
Because temporary tattoo advertisements constitute commercial 
speech, the rationale applied by the Court in Virginia State Board 
applies.95 In Virginia State Board the Court held that a content 
neutral commercial speech regulation is permissible, excusing the 
regulation’s time, manner, and place restrictions.96 As found by the 
district court in Adams, the Commission’s restriction is content-
neutral.97 Therefore, the ban should be upheld. 
Even ignoring the district court’s finding in Adams, the 
Commission’s ban is not content-specific. In Virginia State Board, 
the Court found that the public possessed an important need for the 
free flow of information regarding prescription drug prices that 
trumped the government’s interest in maintaining “professional 
decorum.”98 Unlike the ban in that case, the Commission’s ban does 
not disrupt the free flow of information. Rather, the Commission’s 
ban merely disrupts the means of transferring that information. Thus, 
the Commission’s ban of temporary tattoos is permissible, and a 
reviewing court should not uphold the district court’s determination 
that the ban violates the First Amendment. 
C. Presuming the Ban is not Content-Neutral, the Ban still Fails to 
Infringe on Speech Protected by the First Amendment 
Central Hudson’s four-pronged analysis applies to non-content-
neutral restrictions of commercial speech.99 Even if the 
Commission’s ban restricts commercial speech in a content-specific 
 95. Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976).  
 96. Id.  
 97. Adams, 2002 WL 1967500, at *1. The district court found that the ban applied 
[i]rrespective of content.” Id.  
 98. Va. State Bd. of Pharm., 425 U.S. at 761.  
 99. See supra notes 42–87 and accompanying text.  
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manner, the ban should be upheld because it satisfies Central 
Hudson’s test. 
1. Application of the First Prong 
The Commission’s ban survives Central Hudson’s first prong, 
which seeks to determine whether the First Amendment protects the 
desired expression.100 The First Amendment only protects 
commercial speech that concerns lawful activities.101 Bans on speech 
promoting illegal activity are entirely constitutional.102 While Nevada 
permits gambling activities,103 it prohibits online gambling.104 The 
content of speech at issue in Adams encourages online gambling.105 
Therefore, the ban concerns illegal activity and survives scrutiny 
under Central Hudson’s first prong. 
2. Application of the Second Prong 
The Commission’s ban also survives Central Hudson’s second 
prong, which seeks to determine whether the government has a 
substantial interest in restricting the challenger’s speech.106 In Central 
Hudson, 44 Liquormart, Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass’n, 
Lorillard Tobacco, and Thompson, the Court deferred to the 
 100. Lehv & Wiggins, supra note 47, at 430 (citing Cent. Hudson Gas. & Elec. Corp. v. 
Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)).  
 101. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 560; see also Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Neilly, 533 U.S. 
525, 554 (2001); Greater New Orleans Bd. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 183 (1999); 
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 500 n.9. 
 102. Id. 
 103. NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.0129(1)(a) (2002).  
 104. See id. §§ 465.091 (2002) (defining “medium of communication” to include the 
Internet), 465.092(1) (prohibiting a person from knowingly accepting a wager through any 
medium of communication other than in-person communication), 465.093(1) (prohibiting a 
person from knowingly transmitting a wager through any medium of communication other than 
by in-person communication); see also Defendant’s Opposition to Petitioner’s Motion, 2, 
Adams v. Nev. Athletic Comm’n, No. A446676, 2002 WL 1967500 (Nev. Dist. Ct. 2002) 
[hereinafter Defendent’s Opposition] (arguing that because the message conveyed by the 
temporary tattoo advertisement does not concern a lawful activity in the State of Nevada, the 
court must deny the Adam’s claim). 
 105. See supra note 8.  
 106. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564 
(1980). 
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legislature’s stated interests.107 In Adams, while not explicitly 
deferring to the Commission’s interests in preventing the distraction 
of judges and preserving the dignity of the sport, the district court 
failed to indicate any deficiency in those interests.108 Thus, the ban 
satisfies Central Hudson’s second prong. 
3. Application of the Third Prong 
The Commission’s ban also survives Central Hudson’s third 
prong, which requires that commercial speech restrictions directly 
advance the government interests.109 The district court found that the 
Commission failed to show that the ban directly advanced its 
articulated interests.110  
However, banning temporary tattoos does in fact, forward the 
Commission’s articulated interests. In Thompson, Lorillard Tobacco, 
and Greater New Orleans, the court analyzed the nexus between the 
stated interests in restricting commercial speech and the imposed 
restriction, reasoning in each case that a government must 
demonstrate that the restriction directly alleviates a real concern.111 
The Commission’s ban alleviates real concerns. Interfering with a 
judge’s duties while scoring a bout will cause harm to boxing.112 
Judges play a crucial role in determining the winner, and the integrity 
of the sport may suffer if a judge cannot accurately score a fight.113 
 107. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 371 (2002); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. 
Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 555 (2001); Greater New Orleans Board Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 
173, 186-87 (1999); 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 506-14 (1996); Central 
Hudson, 447 U.S. at 568-69. This fits with the Commission’s argument in Adams. See 
Defendant’s Opposition, supra note 104, at 5 (arguing the Commission has sole direction to 
manage and control all boxing contests within the State of Nevada) (citing NEV. REV. STAT. ch. 
467 § 070(1) (2002)). Additionally, the Nevada Supreme Court has held that an agency’s 
conclusions of law “are entitled to deference.” Defendant’s Opposition, supra (quoting Dep't of 
Motor Vehicles v. Torres, 779 P.2d 959, 961 (Nev. 1989)). 
 108. 2002 WL 1967500, at *1. 
 109. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 568; see also Lorillard Tobacco, 533 U.S. at 554; 
Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 183; 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 500 n.9; Lehv & Wiggins, 
supra note 47, at 429-31.  
 110. Adams, 2002 WL 1967500, at *1.  
 111. Supra notes 71 and 78.  
 112. See Adams, 2002 WL 1967500, at *1; Iole, supra note 2.  
 113. Poor officiating can have negative effects on the image of a sport. For instance, a New 
York Giants fan will likely characterize the 2003 playoff loss to the San Francisco 49ers as a 
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The temporary tattoo markings are much larger than a typical 
clothing logos or even typical permanent tattoos114 as illustrated by 
Hopkins’ GoldenPalace.com endorsement.115 These tattoos will 
distract judges given their excessive size.116 Thus, by prohibiting the 
large ink markings on boxer’s backs, the Commission alleviates a 
judge’s distraction. 
Safety is also a real concern.117 Because of the tattoo’s temporary 
nature, the ink runs during bouts.118 The ink has the potential to rub 
into a boxer’s eyes.119 Prohibiting temporary tattoo advertisement in 
the ring prevents this health and safety risk, a risk not associated with 
the other forms of advertising permitted by the Commission. 
Therefore, the ban survives Central Hudson’s third prong, because it 
directly alleviates the government’s concerns. 
4. Application of the Fourth Prong 
Finally, the Commission’s ban satisfies the fourth prong, which 
requires the regulation to promote the stated interest using the least 
restrictive means.120 The Commission’s ban is clearly narrowly-
“fixed” game. Although the referee simply made the wrong call at a key point in the game, 
spectators will likely see the score as the result of a larger conspiracy against the Giants. Such 
opinions can lead to a broader belief that victories do not come by honest in the National 
Football League; see also Associated Press, Real Deal Real Lucky: Lewis Dominates Holyfield 
in 12, but Judges Rule Title Bout a Draw, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Mar. 15, 1999), available at 
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/more/boxing/news/1999/03/13/fight_story/ (describing the boos 
from the crowd after the judges’ scores were announced).  
 114. Kernaghan, supra note 116 (describing the tattoos as “large Henna temporary 
tattoos”).  
 115. Tattooed Hopkins Breaks Record with Latest Victory, BOXING NEWS, at 
http://euro.goldenpalace.com/boxing/hopkins-vs-daniels.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2003). 
 116. Stuart Kernaghan, Golden Palace Tattoos Breed Controversy, at http://www. 
winneronline.com/articles/april2002/golden_palace.htm (Apr. 22, 2002).  
 117. Iole, supra note 2 (“The commission was concerned that the tattoos could smear and 
get into the eyes of fighters.”). For information on the Commission’s general concern for boxer 
safety, see Hendrick & Kizer, supra note 91.  
 118. Chris Bushnell, Hopkins Dismantles Trinidad in Shocker, at http://www. 
cyberboxingzone.com/boxing chronicle/articles_titoloses.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2003) 
(describing the payment Hopkins received from Golden Palace as a “good deal” because the 
markings ran off after only a few rounds).  
 119. See Iole, supra note 2 (suggesting that the ink could find its way to a boxer’s eyes).  
 120. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Pub. Serv. Corp. of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 569 (1980); see 
also Part I.A.2.  
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tailored. The ban is limited to only temporary tattoos,121 and it 
continues to permit a fighter to endorse products on his shorts122 and 
the shirts worn by his “corner men,”123 as well as permanent 
tattoos.124 
The ban also addresses the Commission’s distraction concern125 
by the least restrictive means. Unlike logos placed on the boxer’s 
shorts or the corner men’s shirts, the temporary tattoo advertisements 
endorsing GoldenPalace.com used large lettering that covered most 
of the boxer’s back.126 The ban prohibits only this. 
Whether the ban addresses the Commission’s dignity concern 
turns on what the Commission means when it states that it has an 
interest in maintaining dignity.127 The Commission does not impose a 
similar ban on permanent tattoos, which suggests the insincerity of 
the dignity concern.128 This argument is unpersuasive because the 
fourth-prong requires a ban to affect the stated interest in the least 
intrusive means.129 The sheer largeness of the temporary tattoo 
endorsement poses a threat to boxing’s dignity. Thus, the ban targets 
in the least intrusive means, those markings that pose only the 
greatest risk to the sport’s dignity.130 While the Commission could 
target all tattoos, it focuses only on temporary tattoos, permitting 
other types of commercial speech and narrowly tailoring its ban. 
Hence, even if we assume that the Commission’s ban is content-
based and the speech at issue concerns legal activity, the 
 121. Adams v. Nev. Athletic Comm’n, No. A446674, 2002 WL 1967500, at *1 (Nev. Dist. 
Ct. 2002) (acknowledging that the Commission did not ban permanent tattoos).  
 122. See Defendant’s Opposition, supra note 104, at 6. The boxer has a variety of 
alternative places to advertise, including his robe and shorts. Id.  
 123. See id. (listing the jackets of corner men as potential sites upon which to place logos). 
The term “corner men” refers to the three or four men who assist the boxer between rounds. See 
NEV. ADMIN. CODE ch. 467, § 628 (2002) (describing the corner men as “seconds”). Each of 
these men typically wears clothing bearing the boxer’s name in the boxer’s colors.  
 124. See supra note 121.  
 125. See supra text accompanying note 108.  
 126. Kernaghan, supra note 116.  
 127. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 
568-69 (1980).  
 128. Id.  
 129. Id. at 564-66. 
 130. Adams v. Nev. Athletic Comm’n, No. A446674, 2002 WL 1967500, at *1 (Nev. Dist. 
Ct. 2002). The district court’s characterization of the “undignified nature” of these tattoos 
suggests such a conclusion. Id.  
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Commission’s actions still should uphold because the ban survives 
Central Hudson’s analysis.  
III. PROPOSAL 
A. The Commission Should Re-Institute the Ban on Temporary Tattoo 
Advertisements 
Because Adams’s scheduled boxing match took place in February 
of 2002, the Adams injunction can not be timely appealed by the 
Commission.131 However, based on the above analysis, the 
Commission should re-adopt the ban on temporary tattoo 
advertisements. The Commission can survive any constitutional 
challenge to its ban by connecting the ban to Nevada’s interests and 
debunking attempts to analyze the ban’s time, manner, and place 
reasonableness.  
B. A Reviewing Court Should Not Follow Adams 
Because the ban addresses commercial speech in a content-neutral 
manner, Virginia State Board of Pharmacy permits the restriction to 
stand as a legitimate commercial speech limitation.132 However, even 
if the ban fails a content-neutral examination as ordered by the court 
in Adams, it retains viability because it survives Central Hudson’s 
analysis.133 Therefore, a reviewing court should uphold the 
Commission’s ban on temporary tattoo advertisements. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court for the Eight District of Nevada erred when it 
enjoined the Commission’s ban on the use of temporary tattoo 
advertisements.134 The ruling extended the constitutional protection 
 131. NEV. R.A.P. 4(a) (2002).  
 132. Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Counsil, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976).  
 133. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566-69 
(1980).  
 134. Adams, 2002 WL 1967500, at *1-*2.  
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of commercial speech beyond that which the Supreme Court holds 
protectable under the landmark cases since 1976, and hence, it should 
be ignored. 
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